Related papers: The Complexity of Testing Properties of Simple Gam…
Game Theory studies situations in which multiple agents having conflicting objectives have to reach a collective decision. The question of a compact representation language for agents utility function is of crucial importance since the…
Simple stochastic games are two-player zero-sum stochastic games with turn-based moves, perfect information, and reachability winning conditions. We present two new algorithms computing the values of simple stochastic games. Both of them…
Voting is a commonly applied method for the aggregation of the preferences of multiple agents into a joint decision. If preferences are binary, i.e., "yes" and "no", every voting system can be described by a (monotone) Boolean function…
We provide several tests to determine whether a game is a potential game or whether it is a zero-sum equivalent game---a game which is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game in the same way that a potential game is strategically…
We introduce the notion of linearly representable games. Broadly speaking, these are TU games that can be described by as many parameters as the number of players, like weighted voting games, airport games, or bankruptcy games. We show that…
Voting is a simple mechanism to aggregate the preferences of agents. Many voting rules have been shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. However, a number of recent theoretical results suggest that this complexity may only be in the worst-case…
We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
Many binary collective choice situations can be described as weighted simple voting games. We introduce weighted committee games to model decisions on an arbitrary number of alternatives in analogous fashion. We compare the effect of…
Election systems based on scores generally determine the winner by computing the score of each candidate and the winner is the candidate with the best score. It would be natural to expect that computing the winner of an election is at least…
This paper studies complexity theoretic aspects of quantum refereed games, which are abstract games between two competing players that send quantum states to a referee, who performs an efficiently implementable joint measurement on the two…
The New York Times (NYT) games have found widespread popularity in recent years and reportedly account for an increasing fraction of the newspaper's readership. In this paper, we bring the computational lens to the study of New York Times…
Iterated admissibility is a well-known and important concept in classical game theory, e.g. to determine rational behaviors in multi-player matrix games. As recently shown by Berwanger, this concept can be soundly extended to infinite games…
Taking the absolute value of consecutive differences of a cyclicly ordered list of integers constitutes a simple dynamical system. For lists of lenght a power of two the process will terminate in all zeros, but examples with arbitarily long…
We study the problem of deciding the winner of reachability switching games for zero-, one-, and two-player variants. Switching games provide a deterministic analogue of stochastic games. We show that the zero-player case is NL-hard, the…
Most theoretical definitions about the complexity of manipulating elections focus on the decision problem of recognizing which instances can be successfully manipulated, rather than the search problem of finding the successful manipulative…
This study investigates simple games. A fundamental research question in this field is to determine necessary and sufficient conditions for a simple game to be a weighted majority game. Taylor and Zwicker (1992) showed that a simple game is…
An important problem in computational social choice theory is the complexity of undesirable behavior among agents, such as control, manipulation, and bribery in election systems. These kinds of voting strategies are often tempting at the…
This paper gives a critical account of the minority game literature. The minority game is a simple congestion game: players need to choose between two options, and those who have selected the option chosen by the minority win. The learning…