Related papers: The norm game in a mean-field society
Mean field games are concerned with the limit of large-population stochastic differential games where the agents interact through their empirical distribution. In the classical setting, the number of players is large but fixed throughout…
Mean-Field Games are games with a continuum of players that incorporate the time-dimension through a control-theoretic approach. Recently, simpler approaches relying on the Best Reply Strategy have been proposed. They assume that the agents…
A social norm defines what is good and what is bad in social contexts, as well as what to do based on such assessments. A stable social norm should be maintained against errors committed by its players. In addition, individuals may have…
We consider N-player and mean field games in continuous time over a finite horizon, where the position of each agent belongs to {-1,1}. If there is uniqueness of mean field game solutions, e.g. under monotonicity assumptions, then the…
We develop a mathematical model to describe the persistence of rule-breaking behaviors in societies, such as traffic violations, disregard for legal restrictions and other forms of noncompliance. Using a replicator-type dynamics with…
We introduce a mean field game with rank-based reward: competing agents optimize their effort to achieve a goal, are ranked according to their completion time, and paid a reward based on their relative rank. First, we propose a tractable…
Our aim is to model a game for power as a dynamical process, where an excess of power possessed by a player allows him to gain even more power. Such a positive feedback is often termed as the Matthew effect. Analytical and numerical methods…
Cooperative behaviour has been extensively studied as a choice between cooperation and defection. However, the possibility to not participate is also frequently available. This type of problem can be studied through the optional public…
Punishment is a common tactic to sustain cooperation and has been extensively studied for a long time. While most of previous game-theoretic work adopt the imitation learning where players imitate the strategies who are better off, the…
In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…
Mean-payoff games play a central role in quantitative synthesis and verification. In a single-dimensional game a weight is assigned to every transition and the objective of the protagonist is to assure a non-negative limit-average weight.…
I study two mechanisms based on punishment to promote cooperation in the two-population snowdrift game. The first mechanism follows the traditional approach in the literature and is based on the inclusion of a third additional strategy in…
This paper suggests a model for the motion of tagged pedestrians: pedestrians moving towards a specified targeted destination, which they are forced to reach. It aims to be a decision-making tool for the positioning of fire fighters,…
In this paper we study mean field games with possibly multiple mean field equilibria. Instead of focusing on the individual equilibria, we propose to study the set of values over all possible equilibria, which we call the set value of the…
The mean field games (MFG) paradigm was introduced to provide tractable approximations of games involving very large populations. The theory typically rests on two key assumptions: homogeneity, meaning that all players share the same…
In this paper we study a class of matrix-valued linear-quadratic mean-field-type games for both the risk-neutral, risk-sensitive and robust cases. Non-cooperation, full cooperation and adversarial between teams are treated. We provide a…
By specifying behaviour across multiple agents, social norms are a coordination approach to resolving social dilemmas. Decentralized and wide adoption can be achieved by norms whose prescription involves interpreting stochastic signals in…
Mean-field game theory relies on approximating games that are intractable to model due to a very large to infinite population of players. While these kinds of games can be solved analytically via the associated system of partial…
We study discounted infinitely repeated games in which players agree on a cooperative mixed action profile but, at each step, observe only the realized pure actions. This form of imperfect monitoring breaks classical trigger strategies,…
The goal of the paper is to introduce a set of problems which we call mean field games of timing. We motivate the formulation by a dynamic model of bank run in a continuous-time setting. We briefly review the economic and game theoretic…