Related papers: Simple Recursive Games
We consider iterative voting models and position them within the general framework of acyclic games and game forms. More specifically, we classify convergence results based on the underlying assumptions on the agent scheduler (the order of…
The relationship between topology and dynamics of complex systems has motivated continuing interest from the scientific community. In the present work, we address this interesting topic from the perspective of simple games, involving two…
We construct games of chance from simpler games of chance. We show that it may happen that the simpler games of chance are fair or unfavourable to a player andyet the new combined game is favourable -- this is a counter-intuitive…
Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must…
We consider estimation procedures which are recursive in the sense that each successive estimator is obtained from the previous one by a simple adjustment. We propose a wide class of recursive estimation procedures for the general…
This note explains why a large class of fair, or reversible "money games", i.e., stochastic models of wealth redistribution among agents, lead to steady states described by canonical and microcanonical distributions. The games considered…
This paper develops a unified framework for zero-sum games in which both the pure strategies and the payoff matrices contain complex-valued entries. By leveraging a linear isomorphism between complex and real vector spaces, we extend key…
A fundamental problem with the Nash equilibrium concept is the existence of certain "structurally deficient" equilibria that (i) lack fundamental robustness properties, and (ii) are difficult to analyze. The notion of a "regular" Nash…
In a monotonic sequence game, two players alternately choose elements of a sequence from some fixed ordered set. The game ends when the resulting sequence contains either an ascending subsequence of length a or a descending one of length d.…
Simple adaptive procedures that converge to correlated equilibria are known to exist for normal form games (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000), but no such analogue exists for extensive-form games. Leveraging inspiration from Zinkevich et al.…
From the standpoint of game theory, dominoes is a game that has not received much attention (specially the variety known as draw). It is usually thought that this game is already solved, given general results in game theory. However, the…
Game logic is a dynamic modal logic which models strategic two person games; it contains propositional dynamic logic (PDL) as a fragment. We propose an interpretation of game logic based on stochastic effectivity functions. A definition of…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
We will describe a combinatorial game that models the problem of resolution of singularities of algebraic varieties over a field of characteristic zero. By giving a winning strategy for this game, we give another proof of the existence of…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
The rank of a bimatrix game is the matrix rank of the sum of the two payoff matrices. This paper comprehensively analyzes games of rank one, and shows the following: (1) For a game of rank r, the set of its Nash equilibria is the…
We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available…
Complex reasoning problems are most clearly and easily specified using logical rules, but require recursive rules with aggregation such as count and sum for practical applications. Unfortunately, the meaning of such rules has been a…
Regular games form a well-established class of games for analysis and synthesis of reactive systems. They include coloured Muller games, McNaughton games, Muller games, Rabin games, and Streett games. These games are played on directed…
A classic model to study strategic decision making in multi-agent systems is the normal-form game. This model can be generalised to allow for an infinite number of pure strategies leading to continuous games. Multi-objective normal-form…