Related papers: Effects of payoff functions and preference distrib…

In an adaptive population which models financial markets and distributed control, we consider how the dynamics depends on the diversity of the agents' initial preferences of strategies. When the diversity decreases, more agents tend to…

We consider a version of large population games whose agents compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. The games can be used to model economic markets, ecosystems or distributed control. Diversity of initial…

We consider a version of large population games whose agents compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. Diversity among the agents reduces their maladpative behavior. We find interesting scaling relations with…

Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…

In the standard minority game, each agent in the minority group receives the same payoff regardless of the size of the minority group. Of great interest for real social and biological systems are cases in which the payoffs to members of the…

Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of…

The paper presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates how,…

We consider a version of large population games whose players compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. The system efficiency is measured by the variance of the decisions. In the regime where the system can be…

We study a multi-agent decision problem in population games, where agents select from multiple available strategies and continually revise their selections based on the payoffs associated with these strategies. Unlike conventional…

In the evolutionary minority game, agents are allowed to evolve their strategies (``mutate'') based on past experience. We explore the dependence of the system's global behavior on the response time and the mutation threshold of the agents.…

We explore the effect of discounting and experimentation in a simple model of interacting adaptive agents. Agents belong to either of two types and each has to decide whether to participate a game or not, the game being profitable when…

In constant-payoff finite population games, when selection is weak and population size is large, the one-third law serves as the condition for a strategy to be advantageous. We generalize the result to the case where payoff matrices are…

We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…

Generalization of the minority game to more than one market is considered. At each time step every agent chooses one of its strategies and acts on the market related to this strategy. If the payoff function allows for strong fluctuation of…

In this paper we present results and analyses of a class of games in which heterogeneous agents are rewarded for being in a minority group. Each agent possesses a number of fixed strategies each of which are predictors of the next minority…

We propose a payoff function extending Minority Games (MG) that captures the competition between agents to make money. In constrast with previous MG, the best strategies are not always targeting the minority but are shifting…

The influence of a fixed number of agents with the same fixed behavior on the dynamics of the minority game is studied. Alternatively, the system studied can be considered the minority game with a change in the comfort threshold away from…

In this work, we consider a population composed of a continuum of agents that seek to maximize a payoff function by moving on a network. The nodes in the network may represent physical locations or abstract choices. The population is…

We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether the…

We study the asymptotic macroscopic properties of the mixed majority-minority game, modeling a population in which two types of heterogeneous adaptive agents, namely ``fundamentalists'' driven by differentiation and ``trend-followers''…