Economics
Less-salient taxes can ease the classic equality-efficiency trade-off by making people respond less to taxation. But deliberately obscuring taxes may be viewed as dishonest. This creates a three-way trade-off between equality, efficiency,…
We examine how the empirical content of revealed preference theory depends on the dimensionality of the choice environment. While higher-dimensional choice problems may appear more demanding, we show that revealed preference restrictions…
We study markets where firms compete for consumer attention by subsidizing costly product inspection. These subsidies do not change product quality, but they alter the order in which consumers search by lowering inspection costs. We…
Building on the $f$-information model of Bloedel et al. (2025), this paper introduces a one-parameter family of information acquisition models and characterizes optimal information acquisition. This family extends the mutual information…
We study economies where consumers interact independently with many monopolists. When consumer valuations over goods are correlated, correlation can distort the induced distribution of consumer surplus (information rents). We identify which…
I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…
This paper studies decision problems where the decision maker's choice of action affects the probability distribution of a payoff relevant random variable. We establish sufficient conditions for the existence of an expected utility…
In our context-free model of a commons, the function$\mathcal{W}$ transforms the profile of the agents' types $(x_{1},..,x_{n})$ to a freely transferable output $\mathcal{W}(x_{1},..,x_{n})$ that they must share fairly. We expand the…
A principal hires an agent to work on a long-term project that culminates in a breakthrough or a breakdown. At each time, the agent privately chooses to work or shirk. Working increases the arrival rate of breakthroughs and decreases the…
In this short note, I show that in a McCall (1970) model with risk-neutral agents, a system of wage insurance combined with unemployment insurance financed by a lump-sum tax on the employed can be replicated -- in the ex ante sense -- by a…
We study the robustness of Bayesian persuasion to uncertainty about the receiver's preferences. We analyze two conceptually distinct notions: continuity, in which only the modeler lacks precise knowledge, but where the model's predictions…
I provide a unified framework to establish the existence of a weak Pareto efficient, envy-free allocation in general settings: random allocations are probability measures on a compact metric space, and preferences of agents are represented…
This paper introduces the Dual-System Thinking (DST) model, a decision-theoretic framework that integrates psychological dual-process theories into economic modeling. A single cognitive weight parameter governs the relative influence of the…
The classic concept of "calibrated forecasts" and its more recent refinement, "calibeating," are defined with respect to the standard quadratic scoring rule. We extend these notions to the class of $\textit{proper}$ scoring rules (for which…
In many choice settings the decision maker (DM) adopts a criterion which is a mediation between her preference, and its opposite. According to such compromise, the first i alternatives on top of the DM's taste are moved, in reverse order,…
We propose and axiomatize preferences on a product state space in light of uncertainty regarding the dependency of different payoff-relevant factors. Dependence structures allow to decompose probabilities and allow to pin down behavior…
We characterize the outcomes of a canonical deterministic model for the intergenerational transmission of capital that features differential fertility. A fertility function determines the relationship between parental capital and the number…
We study the problem of allocating a finite estate among agents whose total claims exceed the available resources, a standard framework in the theory of claims problems. Two canonical rules embody competing fairness ideals: the Proportional…
We study a tractable two-player contest built on a truncated cubic contest success function. Its defining feature is a strategic-feedback parameter whose sign determines whether a leading player's effort lowers (suppression) or raises…
This paper introduces state-robust equilibrium (SRE), a local validity test for Nash predictions in finite-strategy population games when the payoff-relevant aggregate state may be misspecified. The reported prescription and payoff map are…