Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanisms for MMS Approximation

We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among strategic agents with additive valuations. Motivated by impossibility results for deterministic truthful mechanisms, we focus on randomized mechanisms that are \emph{Truthful-in-Expectation (TIE)}. From a fairness perspective, we seek to guarantee every agent a large fraction of their \emph{Maximin Share (MMS)} ex-post. Among other results, Bu~and~Tao~[FOCS 2025] presented a TIE mechanism that guarantees $\frac{1}{n}$-MMS ex-post. First, we present an ordinal TIE mechanism that guarantees $\frac{1}{H_n + 2}$-MMS ex-post, where $H_n$ is the $n$-th harmonic number ($H_n \simeq \ln n$). This is nearly best possible for ordinal mechanisms, as even non-truthful ordinal allocation algorithms cannot obtain an approximation better than $\frac{1}{H_n}$. We then show that with just a small amount of additional cardinal information, the ex-post guarantee can be improved to $\Omega(\frac{1}{\log\log n})$-MMS, at the cost of relaxing the incentive requirement to $(1-\varepsilon(n))$-TIE for negligible $\varepsilon(n)$. Finally, for two agents, we present a TIE mechanism that is $\frac{2}{3}$-MMS ex-post. All our mechanisms are ex-ante proportional (thus also providing ``Best-of-Both-Worlds'' results) and run in polynomial time. Moreover, all our results extend to the truncated proportional share (TPS), which is at least as large as the MMS. Our two-agent $\frac{2}{3}$-TPS result is best possible for the TPS.