Three-state coevolutionary game dynamics with environmental feedback
Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems
2025-10-10 v1 Populations and Evolution
Abstract
Environmental feedback mechanisms are ubiquitous in real-world complex systems. In this study, we incorporate a homogeneous environment into the evolutionary dynamics of a three-state system comprising cooperators, defectors, and empty nodes. Both coherence resonance and equilibrium states, resulting from the tightly clustering of cooperator agglomerates, enhance population survival and environmental quality. The resonance phenomenon arises at the transition between cooperative and defective payoff parameters in the prisoner's dilemma game.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2510.07946,
title = {Three-state coevolutionary game dynamics with environmental feedback},
author = {Yi-Duo Chen and Zhi-Xi Wu and Jian-Yue Guan},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.07946},
year = {2025}
}