The Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective
Abstract
A-theorists and B-theorists debate whether the "Now" is metaphysically distinguished from other time slices. Analogously, one may ask whether the "I" is metaphysically distinguished from other perspectives. Few philosophers would answer the second question in the affirmative. An exception is Caspar Hare, who has devoted two papers and a book to arguing for such a positive answer. In this paper, I argue that those who answer the first question in the affirmative -- A-theorists -- should also answer the second question in the affirmative. This is because key arguments in favor of the A-theory are more effective as arguments in favor of the resulting combined position, and key arguments against the A-theory are ineffective against the combined position.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2008.13207,
title = {The Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective},
author = {Vincent Conitzer},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2008.13207},
year = {2020}
}
Comments
To appear in dialectica: international journal of philosophy and official organ of the European Society of Analytic Philosophy