Present time
History and Philosophy of Physics
2014-03-20 v1
Abstract
The idea of a moving present or `now' seems to form part of our most basic beliefs about reality. Such a present, however, is not reflected in any of our theories of the physical world. I show in this article that presentism, the doctrine that only what is present exists, is in conflict with modern relativistic cosmology and recent advances in neurosciences. I argue for a tenseless view of time, where what we call `the present' is just an emergent secondary quality arising from the interaction of perceiving self-conscious individuals with their environment. I maintain that there is no flow of time, but just an ordered system of events.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1403.4671,
title = {Present time},
author = {Gustavo E. Romero},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1403.4671},
year = {2014}
}
Comments
14 pages, 1 figure. Accepted for publication in Foundations of Science