English

The Inversion Paradox and Ranking Methods in Tournaments

Computer Science and Game Theory 2025-03-05 v1 Multiagent Systems

Abstract

This article deals with ranking methods. We study the situation where a tournament between nn players P1P_1, P2P_2, \ldots PnP_n gives the ranking P1P2PnP_1 \succ P_2 \succ \cdots \succ P_n, but, if the results of PnP_n are no longer taken into account (for example PnP_n is suspended for doping), then the ranking becomes Pn1Pn2P2P1P_{n-1} \succ P_{n-2} \succ \cdots \succ P_2 \succ P_1. If such a situation arises, we call it an inversion paradox. In this article, we give a sufficient condition for the inversion paradox to occur. More precisely, we give an impossibility theorem. We prove that if a ranking method satisfies three reasonable properties (the ranking must be natural, reducible by Condorcet tournaments and satisfies the long tournament property) then we cannot avoid the inversion paradox, i.e., there are tournaments where the inversion paradox occurs. We then show that this paradox can occur when we use classical methods, e.g., Borda, Massey, Colley and Markov methods.

Cite

@article{arxiv.2503.02429,
  title  = {The Inversion Paradox and Ranking Methods in Tournaments},
  author = {Guillaume Chéze and Etienne Fieux},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.02429},
  year   = {2025}
}
R2 v1 2026-06-28T22:06:02.396Z