Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
Quantum Physics
2009-01-23 v2
Abstract
We prove the security of the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement-purification based protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use of quantum computation from the Lo-Chau protocol.
Cite
@article{arxiv.quant-ph/0003004,
title = {Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol},
author = {Peter W. Shor and John Preskill},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:quant-ph/0003004},
year = {2009}
}
Comments
5 pages, Latex, minor changes to improve clarity and fix typos