Robust Tournaments
Theoretical Economics
2025-07-23 v1
Abstract
We characterize robust tournament design -- the prize scheme that maximizes the lowest effort in a rank-order tournament where the distribution of noise is unknown, except for an upper bound, , on its Shannon entropy. The robust tournament scheme awards positive prizes to all ranks except the last, with a distinct top prize. Asymptotically, the prizes follow the harmonic number sequence and induce an exponential distribution of noise with rate parameter . The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching .
Cite
@article{arxiv.2507.16348,
title = {Robust Tournaments},
author = {Mikhail Drugov and Dmitry Ryvkin},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2507.16348},
year = {2025}
}