English

Robust Tournaments

Theoretical Economics 2025-07-23 v1

Abstract

We characterize robust tournament design -- the prize scheme that maximizes the lowest effort in a rank-order tournament where the distribution of noise is unknown, except for an upper bound, Hˉ\bar{H}, on its Shannon entropy. The robust tournament scheme awards positive prizes to all ranks except the last, with a distinct top prize. Asymptotically, the prizes follow the harmonic number sequence and induce an exponential distribution of noise with rate parameter eHˉe^{-\bar{H}}. The robust prize scheme is highly unequal, especially in small tournaments, but becomes more equitable as the number of participants grows, with the Gini coefficient approaching 1/21/2.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2507.16348,
  title  = {Robust Tournaments},
  author = {Mikhail Drugov and Dmitry Ryvkin},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2507.16348},
  year   = {2025}
}
R2 v1 2026-07-01T04:12:56.905Z