Public Announcements in Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets
Computer Science and Game Theory
2010-12-24 v1
Abstract
In [Van Benthem 2007] the concept of a public announcement is used to study the effect of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We offer a simple generalisation of this approach to cover arbitrary strategic games and many optimality notions. We distinguish between announcements of optimality and announcements of rationality.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1012.5173,
title = {Public Announcements in Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets},
author = {Krzysztof R. Apt and Jonathan A. Zvesper},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1012.5173},
year = {2010}
}
Comments
11 pages; presented at LOFT 2010 (9th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory) University of Toulouse,France, 5-7 July, 2010