Related papers: Public Announcements in Strategic Games with Arbit…

We provide an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on possibility correspondences. We first establish a generic result that links true common beliefs (and, respectively, common knowledge) of players' rationality defined by…

We propose a multi-agent logic of knowledge, public and arbitrary announcements, that is interpreted on topological spaces in the style of subset space semantics. The arbitrary announcement modality functions similarly to the effort…

In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.…

We formalise the notion of an anonymous public announcement in the tradition of public announcement logic. Such announcements can be seen as in-between a public announcement from ``the outside" (an announcement of $\phi$) and a public…

Strategic decision-making in uncertain and adversarial environments is crucial for the security of modern systems and infrastructures. A salient feature of many optimal decision-making policies is a level of unpredictability, or randomness,…

Quantification over public announcements shifts the perspective from reasoning strictly about the results of a particular announcement to reasoning about the existence of an announcement that achieves some certain epistemic goal. Depending…

A shallow semantical embedding for public announcement logic with relativized common knowledge is presented. This embedding enables the first-time automation of this logic with off-the-shelf theorem provers for classical higher-order logic.…

The rationalizability concept was introduced in \cite{Ber84} and \cite{Pea84} to assess what can be inferred by rational players in a non-cooperative game in the presence of common knowledge. However, this notion can be defined in a number…

This short note is devoted to the unraveling of the hidden interactivity of ordinary games which is an artefact of predictions of the behaviour of other players by the fixed player and describes deviations of their real behaviour from such…

Many collective decision-making settings feature a strategic tension between agents acting out of individual self-interest and promoting a common good. These include wearing face masks during a pandemic, voting, and vaccination. Networked…

Arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL) reasons about how the knowledge of a set of agents changes after true public announcements and after arbitrary announcements of true epistemic formulas. We consider a variant of arbitrary public…

Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally considered from the perspective of complete revelation of benefits achieved from those interactions, in the form of public payoff functions and/or beliefs, in the announced…

It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We…

We propose a general framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about other votes or about other voters' knowledge about her own vote. In this setting we define notions of manipulation and equilibrium. We also model…

In this paper we introduce public announcement logic in different geometric frameworks. First, we consider topological models, and then extend our discussion to a more expressive model, namely, subset space models. Furthermore, we prove the…

Announcement games, where information is disseminated by announcers and challenged by validators, are prevalent in real-world scenarios. Validators take effort to verify the validity of the announcements, gaining rewards for successfully…

We provide here an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on the possibility correspondences. Such an analysis calls for the use of transfinite iterations of the corresponding operators. Our approach is based on Tarski's…

In online advertising, search engines sell ad placements for keywords continuously through auctions. This problem can be seen as an infinitely repeated game since the auction is executed whenever a user performs a query with the keyword. As…

We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through…

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and…