Preference fusion when the number of alternatives exceeds two: indirect scoring procedures
Optimization and Control
2011-10-11 v3 Multiagent Systems
Combinatorics
Abstract
We consider the problem of aggregation of incomplete preferences represented by arbitrary binary relations or incomplete paired comparison matrices. For a number of indirect scoring procedures we examine whether or not they satisfy the axiom of self-consistent monotonicity. The class of {\em win-loss combining scoring procedures} is introduced which contains a majority of known scoring procedures. Two main results are established. According to the first one, every win-loss combining scoring procedure breaks self-consistent monotonicity. The second result provides a sufficient condition of satisfying self-consistent monotonicity.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.math/0602171,
title = {Preference fusion when the number of alternatives exceeds two: indirect scoring procedures},
author = {Pavel Chebotarev and Elena Shamis},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:math/0602171},
year = {2011}
}
Comments
26 pages, 5 figures One typo fixed