Preference for Verifiability
Theoretical Economics
2026-03-03 v2
Abstract
Decision makers sometimes cannot observe the consequences of their actions ex-post. This paper axiomatically characterizes a decision model in which the decision maker cares about verifying that a good consequence has been achieved. Preferences over acts identify a set of events the decision maker expects to verify. Decision makers choose acts maximizing, in expectation over verifiable events, the worst-case utility consistent with each event. A dual model captures decision makers who instead seek to obscure poor outcomes from verification. As an application, firms choosing carbon-reduction technologies may prefer less efficient but more verifiable technologies to prove emission reductions to stakeholders.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2508.19585,
title = {Preference for Verifiability},
author = {Hendrik Rommeswinkel},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2508.19585},
year = {2026}
}