Phragm\'en's sequential method with a variance criterion
Optimization and Control
2016-11-22 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory
Authors:
Xavier Mora
Abstract
A variant of Phragm\'en's method for proportional representation via approval voting is briefly explored. Instead of D'Hondt's rule, this variant generalizes Sainte-Lagu\"e's rule.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1611.06833,
title = {Phragm\'en's sequential method with a variance criterion},
author = {Xavier Mora},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.06833},
year = {2016}
}
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