English

Module Lattice Security (Part III): Structured CVP Distance on the Log-Unit Lattice

Data Structures and Algorithms 2026-05-19 v1 Cryptography and Security Number Theory Statistics Theory Quantum Physics Statistics Theory

Abstract

We prove that the L2L^2 CVP distance from a random short ring element to the log-unit lattice of \Q(ζ2k)\Q(\zeta_{2^k}) converges to π26n\frac{\pi}{2\sqrt{6}}\sqrt{n} as n=2k1n=2^{k-1}\to\infty. We then show that this target lies inside the Voronoi cell of the origin for k4k\ge 4. For the LL^\infty norm, the maximum over nn sub-Gaussian coordinates yields O(logn)O(\sqrt{\log n}) which translates into a sub-polynomial approximation factor for the Short Generator Problem. We show a Coarse Lattice Theorem that Babai's algorithm returns zero for all structured targets, yet exactly recovers unit perturbations of arbitrary size. For module determinant ideals, we further prove the Trigamma Theorem that proves an intrinsic imbalance σg0=O(1)\sigma_{g_0}=O(1) independent of the modulus qq. Finally, combined with Parts I and II, we reduce the CDPR factor for ML-KEM from exp(\tO(n))\exp(\tO(\sqrt{n})) to a sub-polynomial value.

Cite

@article{arxiv.2605.17404,
  title  = {Module Lattice Security (Part III): Structured CVP Distance on the Log-Unit Lattice},
  author = {Ming-Xing Luo},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2605.17404},
  year   = {2026}
}

Comments

26 pages (simplied version). Most important part in this series

R2 v1 2026-07-22T07:17:20.445Z