Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Policymaking
Theoretical Economics
2022-09-15 v1
Abstract
We introduce a method to derive from a characterization of institutional choice rules (or priority rules), a characterization of the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance (DA) matching rule based on these choice rules. We apply our method to school choice in Chile, where we design choice rules for schools that are uniquely compatible with the School Inclusion Law and derive a set of matching properties, compatible with the law, that characterizes the DA rule based on the designed choice rules. Our method provides a recipe for establishing such results and can help policymakers decide on which allocation rule to use in practice.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2209.06777,
title = {Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Policymaking},
author = {Battal Doğan and Kenzo Imamura and M. Bumin Yenmez},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.06777},
year = {2022}
}