English

Hardware-Friendly Randomization: Enabling Random-Access and Minimal Wiring in FHE Accelerators with Low Total Cost

Cryptography and Security 2026-02-24 v1 Hardware Architecture

Abstract

The Ring-Learning With Errors (RLWE) problem forms the backbone of highly efficient Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) schemes. A significant component of the RLWE public key and ciphertext of the form (b,a)(b,a) is the uniformly random polynomial aRqa \in R_q . While essential for security, the communication overhead of transmitting aa from client to server, and inputting it into a hardware accelerator, can be substantial, especially for FHE accelerators aiming at high acceleration factors. A known technique in reducing this overhead generates aa from a small seed on the client side via a deterministic process, transmits only the seed, and generates aa on-the-fly within the accelerator. Challenges in the hardware implementation of an accelerator include wiring (density and power), compute area, compute power as well as flexibility in scheduling of on-the-fly generation instructions. This extended abstract proposes a concrete scheme and parameters wherein these practical challenges are addressed. We detail the benefits of our approach, which maintains the reduction in communication latency and memory footprint, while allowing parallel generation of uniformly distributed samples, relaxed wiring requirements, unrestricted randomaccess to RNS limbs, and results in an extremely low overhead on the client side (i.e. less than 3%) during the key generation process. The proposed scheme eliminates the need for thick metal layers for randomness distribution and prevents the power consumption of the PRNG subsystem from scaling prohibitively with the acceleration factor, potentially saving tens of Watts per accelerator chip in high-throughput configurations.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2602.19550,
  title  = {Hardware-Friendly Randomization: Enabling Random-Access and Minimal Wiring in FHE Accelerators with Low Total Cost},
  author = {Ilan Rosenfeld and Noam Kleinburd and Hillel Chapman and Dror Reuven},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2602.19550},
  year   = {2026}
}
R2 v1 2026-07-01T10:46:56.759Z