First Price Auction is $1-1/e^2$ Efficient
Computer Science and Game Theory
2023-08-29 v2
Abstract
We prove that the {\sf PoA} of {\sf First Price Auctions} is 1−1/e2≈0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430,0.8689].
Cite
@article{arxiv.2207.01761,
title = {First Price Auction is $1-1/e^2$ Efficient},
author = {Yaonan Jin and Pinyan Lu},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2207.01761},
year = {2023}
}
Comments
To appear in JACM
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