English

First Price Auction is $1-1/e^2$ Efficient

Computer Science and Game Theory 2023-08-29 v2

Abstract

We prove that the {\sf PoA} of {\sf First Price Auctions} is 11/e20.86471 - 1/e^2 \approx 0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430,0.8689][0.7430,\, 0.8689].

Cite

@article{arxiv.2207.01761,
  title  = {First Price Auction is $1-1/e^2$ Efficient},
  author = {Yaonan Jin and Pinyan Lu},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2207.01761},
  year   = {2023}
}

Comments

To appear in JACM

R2 v1 2026-06-24T12:13:56.784Z