Defensive Resource Allocation in Social Networks
Social and Information Networks
2015-07-31 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory
Abstract
In this work, we are interested on the analysis of competing marketing campaigns between an incumbent who dominates the market and a challenger who wants to enter the market. We are interested in (a) the simultaneous decision of how many resources to allocate to their potential customers to advertise their products for both marketing campaigns, and (b) the optimal allocation on the situation in which the incumbent knows the entrance of the challenger and thus can predict its response. Applying results from game theory, we characterize these optimal strategic resource allocations for the voter model of social networks.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1507.08462,
title = {Defensive Resource Allocation in Social Networks},
author = {Alonso Silva and Antonia Maria Masucci},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1507.08462},
year = {2015}
}
Comments
arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1402.5388