Bribeproof mechanisms for two-values domains
Abstract
Schummer (Journal of Economic Theory 2000) introduced the concept of bribeproof mechanism which, in a context where monetary transfer between agents is possible, requires that manipulations through bribes are ruled out. Unfortunately, in many domains, the only bribeproof mechanisms are the trivial ones which return a fixed outcome. This work presents one of the few constructions of non-trivial bribeproof mechanisms for these quasi-linear environments. Though the suggested construction applies to rather restricted domains, the results obtained are tight: For several natural problems, the method yields the only possible bribeproof mechanism and no such mechanism is possible on more general domains.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1512.04277,
title = {Bribeproof mechanisms for two-values domains},
author = {Matúš Mihalák and Paolo Penna and Peter Widmayer},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.04277},
year = {2016}
}
Comments
Extended abstract accepted to SAGT 2016. This ArXiv version corrects typos in the proofs of Theorem 7 and Claims 28-29 of prior ArXiv version