Approximation and Hardness of Shift-Bribery
Computer Science and Game Theory
2019-08-29 v1
Abstract
In the Shift-Bribery problem we are given an election, a preferred candidate, and the costs of shifting this preferred candidate up the voters' preference orders. The goal is to find such a set of shifts that ensures that the preferred candidate wins the election. We give the first polynomial-time approximation scheme for the Shift-Bribery problem for the case of positional scoring rules, and for the Copeland rule we show strong inapproximability results.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1908.10562,
title = {Approximation and Hardness of Shift-Bribery},
author = {Piotr Faliszewski and Pasin Manurangsi and Krzysztof Sornat},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.10562},
year = {2019}
}
Comments
An extended abstract of this work appears in AAAI'19