English

A note on the undercut procedure

Computer Science and Game Theory 2014-02-11 v2

Abstract

The undercut procedure was presented by Brams et al. [2] as a procedure for identifying an envy-free allocation when agents have preferences over sets of objects. They assumed that agents have strict preferences over objects and their preferences are extended over to sets of objects via the responsive set extension. We point out some shortcomings of the undercut procedure. We then simplify the undercut procedure of Brams et al. [2] and show that it works under a more general condition where agents may express indifference between objects and they may not necessarily have responsive preferences over sets of objects. Finally, we show that the procedure works even if agents have unequal claims.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1312.6444,
  title  = {A note on the undercut procedure},
  author = {Haris Aziz},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6444},
  year   = {2014}
}

Comments

5 pages

R2 v1 2026-06-22T02:33:46.374Z