A Contextuality Based Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
Abstract
In this article we present a new prepare and measure quantum key distribution protocol that uses an experimentally accessible measure of single qubit contextuality to warranty the security of the quantum channel. The definition of contextuality used is that due to Spekkens in which any underlying hidden variable model of the physical system is noncontextual if the probability distribution of the model's hidden variables is independent of the preparation and measurement context. Under this more general definition of noncontextuality the measurement outcomes of a single qubit can be shown to require a contextual model in order to reproduce the results of some non-projective, positive operator valued measurements (POVMs). The proposed protocol utilizes a particular set of POVMs to exhibit the degree of contextuality of the qubits exiting the QKD system's quantum channel. The contextuality measure is defined in terms of the weak values of a set of projective measurements that are implemented as POVMs using weak measurements. The resulting QKD protocol should have a key rate that is equal to or greater than BB84 since none of the sifted key is used to test for the presence of an eavesdropper. Additionally, the new protocol is shown to be immune to detector based attacks.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1512.02256,
title = {A Contextuality Based Quantum Key Distribution Protocol},
author = {J. E. Troupe and J. M. Farinholt},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.02256},
year = {2015}
}
Comments
15 pages, 1 figure, 1 table, 1 appendix. Changes in v2: Added a table that lists the steps of the protocol, clarified the definition of the dark count attenuation parameter, made other minor changes and grammatical corrections. No changes to the technical content