The Computational Boundary of Inference: Capability Internalization, Training, and the Turing Jump
Abstract
Claims about recursive self-improvement in AI often slide from repeated internal revision to the possibility of qualitatively stronger capability without clearly distinguishing the underlying computational regimes. This paper gives a formal separation result in classical computability theory that blocks that move under a precise modeling assumption. For an oracle , let be the corresponding computational layer. We prove that finite internal self-modification remains inside , while stabilized revision is governed instead by the jump via the relativized limit lemma. Together with a local closure versus escape theorem, this yields a clean formal separation between within-layer iteration and ascent to a stronger relative level. The point is not that stronger layers never arise, but that they are not explained by finite repetition inside one already settled layer. The resulting separation gives a computability-theoretic limit on a broad class of recursive-improvement narratives in which repeated internal updating is treated as sufficient for qualitative capability ascent.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2605.27381,
title = {The Computational Boundary of Inference: Capability Internalization, Training, and the Turing Jump},
author = {Chien-Ping Lu},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2605.27381},
year = {2026}
}
Comments
11 pages, 1 figure, v2