Suszko's Thesis and Many-valued Logical Structures

In this article, we try to formulate a definition of ''many-valued logical structure''. For this, we embark on a deeper study of Suszko's Thesis ($\mathbf{ST}$) and show that the truth or falsity of $\mathbf{ST}$ depends, at least, on the precise notion of semantics. We propose two different notions of semantics and three different notions of entailment. The first one helps us formulate a precise definition of inferentially many-valued logical structures. The second and the third help us to generalise Suszko Reduction and provide adequate bivalent semantics for monotonic and a couple of nonmonotonic logical structures. All these lead us to a closer examination of the played by language/metalanguage hierarchy vis-\'a-vis $\mathbf{ST}$. We conclude that many-valued logical structures can be obtained if the bivalence of all the higher-order metalogics of the logic under consideration is discarded, building formal bridges between the theory of graded consequence and the theory of many-valued logical structures, culminating in generalisations of Suszko's Thesis.