English

Strong Secrecy for Erasure Wiretap Channels

Information Theory 2010-10-26 v1 math.IT

Abstract

We show that duals of certain low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes, when used in a standard coset coding scheme, provide strong secrecy over the binary erasure wiretap channel (BEWC). This result hinges on a stopping set analysis of ensembles of LDPC codes with block length nn and girth 2k\geq 2k, for some k2k \geq 2. We show that if the minimum left degree of the ensemble is lminl_\mathrm{min}, the expected probability of block error is \calO(1nlmink/2k)\calO(\frac{1}{n^{\lceil l_\mathrm{min} k /2 \rceil - k}}) when the erasure probability ϵ<ϵef\epsilon < \epsilon_\mathrm{ef}, where ϵef\epsilon_\mathrm{ef} depends on the degree distribution of the ensemble. As long as lmin>2l_\mathrm{min} > 2 and k>2k > 2, the dual of this LDPC code provides strong secrecy over a BEWC of erasure probability greater than 1ϵef1 - \epsilon_\mathrm{ef}.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1004.5540,
  title  = {Strong Secrecy for Erasure Wiretap Channels},
  author = {Ananda T. Suresh and Arunkumar Subramanian and Andrew Thangaraj and Matthieu Bloch and Steven McLaughlin},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1004.5540},
  year   = {2010}
}

Comments

Submitted to the Information Theory Workship (ITW) 2010, Dublin

R2 v1 2026-06-21T15:17:02.457Z