Even though recent years have seen many attacks exposing severe vulnerabilities in Federated Learning (FL), a holistic understanding of what enables these attacks and how they can be mitigated effectively is still lacking. In this work, we demystify the inner workings of existing (targeted) attacks. We provide new insights into why these attacks are possible and why a definitive solution to FL robustness is challenging. We show that the need for ML algorithms to memorize tail data has significant implications for FL integrity. This phenomenon has largely been studied in the context of privacy; our analysis sheds light on its implications for ML integrity. We show that certain classes of severe attacks can be mitigated effectively by enforcing constraints such as norm bounds on clients' updates. We investigate how to efficiently incorporate these constraints into secure FL protocols in the single-server setting. Based on this, we propose RoFL, a new secure FL system that extends secure aggregation with privacy-preserving input validation. Specifically, RoFL can enforce constraints such as L2 and L∞ bounds on high-dimensional encrypted model updates.
@article{arxiv.2107.03311,
title = {RoFL: Robustness of Secure Federated Learning},
author = {Hidde Lycklama and Lukas Burkhalter and Alexander Viand and Nicolas Küchler and Anwar Hithnawi},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2107.03311},
year = {2023}
}