Recently, a new type of quantum key distribution, called the round-robin differential phase-shift (RRDPS) protocol [Nature 509, 475 (2014)], was proposed, where the security can be guaranteed without monitoring any statistics. In this Letter, we investigate source imperfections and side-channel attacks on the source of this protocol. We show that only three assumptions are needed for the security, and no detailed characterizations of the source or the side-channel attacks are needed. This high robustness is another striking advantage of the RRDPS protocol over other protocols.
@article{arxiv.1510.00327,
title = {Robustness of round-robin differential-phase-shift quantum-key-distribution protocol against source flaws},
author = {Akihiro Mizutani and Nobuyuki Imoto and Kiyoshi Tamaki},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1510.00327},
year = {2016}
}
Comments
The new version can deal with sending pulses that are classically correlated with each other in an arbitrary manner