Robust Optimal Risk Sharing and Risk Premia in Expanding Pools
Risk Management
2017-05-01 v1 Probability
Abstract
We consider the problem of optimal risk sharing in a pool of cooperative agents. We analyze the asymptotic behavior of the certainty equivalents and risk premia associated with the Pareto optimal risk sharing contract as the pool expands. We first study this problem under expected utility preferences with an objectively or subjectively given probabilistic model. Next, we develop a robust approach by explicitly taking uncertainty about the probabilistic model (ambiguity) into account. The resulting robust certainty equivalents and risk premia compound risk and ambiguity aversion. We provide explicit results on their limits and rates of convergence, induced by Pareto optimal risk sharing in expanding pools.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1601.06979,
title = {Robust Optimal Risk Sharing and Risk Premia in Expanding Pools},
author = {Thomas Knispel and Roger J. A. Laeven and Gregor Svindland},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1601.06979},
year = {2017}
}