English

Resilience Revisited: A Multidimensional Framework Derived from Realistic Attack Scenarios

Systems and Control 2026-04-24 v1 Systems and Control

Abstract

Power systems are increasingly vulnerable to high-impact, low-probability (HILP) events, including coordinated cyberattacks targeting inverter-based resources. Existing resilience frameworks rely on single-dimensional metrics that fail to capture cross-dimensional coupling effects, underestimating real system degradation under multi-vector attack conditions. This study proposes a Multidimensional Resilience Index (MDRI) that decomposes power system degradation into five interacting dimensions: physical, operational, digital-cyber, climatic, and regulatory, explicitly separating independent and coupled contributions via a calibrated multiplicative interaction term. The framework is validated on the IEEE 39-bus system under two attack scenarios derived from the December 2025 cyberattack on the Polish energy infrastructure. MDRI results show that multi-vector attacks produce degradation exceeding linear expectations by a factor of 5.6, with simultaneous dimensional failures contributing an additional 60.6% through endogenous coupling, and exogenous factors amplifying it by an additional 84%.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2604.21685,
  title  = {Resilience Revisited: A Multidimensional Framework Derived from Realistic Attack Scenarios},
  author = {Isaac Ortega Romero and Ioannis Zografopoulos},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2604.21685},
  year   = {2026}
}

Comments

6 pages, IEEE SmartGridComm 2026

R2 v1 2026-07-01T12:32:30.491Z