Palatable Conceptions of Disembodied Being
Artificial Intelligence
2025-07-22 v3
Abstract
Is it possible to articulate a conception of consciousness that is compatible with the exotic characteristics of contemporary, disembodied AI systems, and that can stand up to philosophical scrutiny? How would subjective time and selfhood show up for an entity that conformed to such a conception? Trying to answer these questions, even metaphorically, stretches the language of consciousness to breaking point. Ultimately, the attempt yields something like emptiness, in the Buddhist sense, and helps to undermine our dualistic inclinations towards subjectivity and selfhood.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2503.16348,
title = {Palatable Conceptions of Disembodied Being},
author = {Murray Shanahan},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.16348},
year = {2025}
}