We present, MultiK, a Linux-based framework 1 that reduces the attack surface for operating system kernels by reducing code bloat. MultiK "orchestrates" multiple kernels that are specialized for individual applications in a transparent manner. This framework is flexible to accommodate different kernel code reduction techniques and, most importantly, run the specialized kernels with near-zero additional runtime overheads. MultiK avoids the overheads of virtualization and runs natively on the system. For instance, an Apache instance is shown to run on a kernel that has (a) 93.68% of its code reduced, (b) 19 of 23 known kernel vulnerabilities eliminated and (c) with negligible performance overheads (0.19%). MultiK is a framework that can integrate with existing code reduction and OS security techniques. We demonstrate this by using D-KUT and S-KUT -- two methods to profile and eliminate unwanted kernel code. The whole process is transparent to the user applications because MultiK does not require a recompilation of the application.
@article{arxiv.1903.06889,
title = {MultiK: A Framework for Orchestrating Multiple Specialized Kernels},
author = {Hsuan-Chi Kuo and Akshith Gunasekaran and Yeongjin Jang and Sibin Mohan and Rakesh B. Bobba and David Lie and Jesse Walker},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.06889},
year = {2019}
}