Hindering reaction attacks by using monomial codes in the McEliece cryptosystem
Abstract
In this paper we study recent reaction attacks against QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC code-based cryptosystems, which allow an opponent to recover the private parity-check matrix through its distance spectrum by observing a sufficiently high number of decryption failures. We consider a special class of codes, known as monomial codes, to form private keys with the desirable property of having a unique and complete distance spectrum. We verify that for these codes the problem of recovering the secret key from the distance spectrum is equivalent to that of finding cliques in a graph, and use this equivalence to prove that current reaction attacks are not applicable when codes of this type are used in the McEliece cryptosystem.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1805.04722,
title = {Hindering reaction attacks by using monomial codes in the McEliece cryptosystem},
author = {Paolo Santini and Marco Baldi and Giovanni Cancellieri and Franco Chiaraluce},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.04722},
year = {2018}
}
Comments
5 pages, 0 figures, 1 table, accepted for presentation at the 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)