English

FIPS 204-Compatible Threshold ML-DSA via Shamir Nonce DKG

Cryptography and Security 2026-03-05 v6

Abstract

We present the first threshold ML-DSA (FIPS 204) scheme achieving nonce share privacy (conditional min-entropy guarantee; no computational assumptions) with arbitrary thresholds, while producing standard 3.3 KB signatures verifiable by unmodified implementations. Our primary technique, Shamir nonce DKG, generates the signing nonce as a degree-(T1)(T-1) Shamir sharing, matching the structure of the long-term secret. This gives each honest party's nonce share conditional min-entropy exceeding 5×5\times the secret-key entropy for signing sets of size at most 17. In coordinator-based profiles (P1, P3+), this removes the two-honest requirement (ST|S| \geq T suffices); in the fully distributed profile (P2), mask-hiding additionally requires SC2|S \setminus C| \geq 2. Key privacy of the aggregate signature is an open problem, analogous to single-signer ML-DSA. As a secondary technique, pairwise-canceling PRF masks handle three challenges unique to lattice-based threshold signing: commitment binding, the r0-check predicate, and response aggregation.

Cite

@article{arxiv.2601.20917,
  title  = {FIPS 204-Compatible Threshold ML-DSA via Shamir Nonce DKG},
  author = {Leo Kao},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2601.20917},
  year   = {2026}
}

Comments

98 pages, includes complete UC proofs (Profiles P1/P2/P3+), Rust implementation and benchmarks

R2 v1 2026-07-01T09:24:27.742Z