English

Efficient Byzantine-Robust and Provably Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning

Cryptography and Security 2024-07-30 v1

Abstract

Federated learning (FL) is an emerging distributed learning paradigm without sharing participating clients' private data. However, existing works show that FL is vulnerable to both Byzantine (security) attacks and data reconstruction (privacy) attacks. Almost all the existing FL defenses only address one of the two attacks. A few defenses address the two attacks, but they are not efficient and effective enough. We propose BPFL, an efficient Byzantine-robust and provably privacy-preserving FL method that addresses all the issues. Specifically, we draw on state-of-the-art Byzantine-robust FL methods and use similarity metrics to measure the robustness of each participating client in FL. The validity of clients are formulated as circuit constraints on similarity metrics and verified via a zero-knowledge proof. Moreover, the client models are masked by a shared random vector, which is generated based on homomorphic encryption. In doing so, the server receives the masked client models rather than the true ones, which are proven to be private. BPFL is also efficient due to the usage of non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. Experimental results on various datasets show that our BPFL is efficient, Byzantine-robust, and privacy-preserving.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2407.19703,
  title  = {Efficient Byzantine-Robust and Provably Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning},
  author = {Chenfei Nie and Qiang Li and Yuxin Yang and Yuede Ji and Binghui Wang},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.19703},
  year   = {2024}
}

Comments

13 pages

R2 v1 2026-06-28T17:56:19.790Z