Dempster-Shafer vs. Probabilistic Logic
Artificial Intelligence
2013-04-11 v1
Abstract
The combination of evidence in Dempster-Shafer theory is compared with the combination of evidence in probabilistic logic. Sufficient conditions are stated for these two methods to agree. It is then shown that these conditions are minimal in the sense that disagreement can occur when any one of them is removed. An example is given in which the traditional assumption of conditional independence of evidence on hypotheses holds and a uniform prior is assumed, but probabilistic logic and Dempster's rule give radically different results for the combination of two evidence events.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1304.2713,
title = {Dempster-Shafer vs. Probabilistic Logic},
author = {Daniel Hunter},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1304.2713},
year = {2013}
}
Comments
Appears in Proceedings of the Third Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI1987)