English

Deduction Theorem: The Problematic Nature of Common Practice in Game Theory

Artificial Intelligence 2021-08-31 v2

Abstract

We consider the Deduction Theorem used in the literature of game theory to run a purported proof by contradiction. In the context of game theory, it is stated that if we have a proof of ϕφ\phi \vdash \varphi, then we also have a proof of ϕφ\phi \Rightarrow \varphi. Hence, the proof of ϕφ\phi \Rightarrow \varphi is deduced from a previously known statement. However, we argue that one has to manage to establish that a proof exists for the clauses ϕ\phi and φ\varphi, i.e., they are known true statements in order to show that ϕφ\phi \vdash \varphi is provable, and that therefore ϕφ\phi \Rightarrow \varphi is provable as well. Thus, we are not allowed to assume that the clause ϕ\phi or φ\varphi is a true statement. This leads immediately to a wrong conclusion. Apart from this, we stress to other facts why the Deduction Theorem is not applicable to run a proof by contradiction. Finally, we present an example from industrial cooperation where the Deduction Theorem is not correctly applied with the consequence that the obtained result contradicts the well-known aggregation issue.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1908.00409,
  title  = {Deduction Theorem: The Problematic Nature of Common Practice in Game Theory},
  author = {Holger I. Meinhardt},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.00409},
  year   = {2021}
}

Comments

14 pages, 4 figures, 2 tables

R2 v1 2026-06-23T10:37:20.197Z