Software control flow integrity (CFI) solutions have been applied to the Linux kernel for memory protection. Due to performance costs, deployed software CFI solutions are coarse grained. In this work, we demonstrate a precise hardware-assisted kernel CFI running on widely-used off-the-shelf processors. Specifically, we use the ARMv8.3 pointer authentication (PAuth) extension and present a design that uses it to achieve strong security guarantees with minimal performance penalties. Furthermore, we show how deployment of such security primitives in the kernel can significantly differ from their user space application.
@article{arxiv.1912.04145,
title = {Camouflage: Hardware-assisted CFI for the ARM Linux kernel},
author = {Rémi Denis-Courmont and Hans Liljestrand and Carlos Chinea and Jan-Erik Ekberg},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1912.04145},
year = {2019}
}