Better Foundations for Subjective Probability
Other Statistics
2023-12-18 v1 Theoretical Economics
Statistics Theory
Statistics Theory
Abstract
How do we ascribe subjective probability? In decision theory, this question is often addressed by representation theorems, going back to Ramsey (1926), which tell us how to define or measure subjective probability by observable preferences. However, standard representation theorems make strong rationality assumptions, in particular expected utility maximization. How do we ascribe subjective probability to agents which do not satisfy these strong rationality assumptions? I present a representation theorem with weak rationality assumptions which can be used to define or measure subjective probability for partly irrational agents.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2312.09796,
title = {Better Foundations for Subjective Probability},
author = {Sven Neth},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2312.09796},
year = {2023}
}
Comments
Forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy