Analysis of common attacks in LDPCC-based public-key cryptosystems
Disordered Systems and Neural Networks
2009-11-10 v1
Abstract
We analyze the security and reliability of a recently proposed class of public-key cryptosystems against attacks by unauthorized parties who have acquired partial knowledge of one or more of the private key components and/or of the plaintext. Phase diagrams are presented, showing critical partial knowledge levels required for unauthorized decryption
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.cond-mat/0305172,
title = {Analysis of common attacks in LDPCC-based public-key cryptosystems},
author = {N. S. Skantzos and D. Saad and Y. Kabashima},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:cond-mat/0305172},
year = {2009}
}
Comments
14 pages, 6 figures