Adversarial Graph Traversal
Optimization and Control
2026-02-12 v1
Abstract
Suppose a Bayesian agent seeks to traverse a graph. Each time she crosses an edge, she pays a price. The first time she reaches a node, there is a payoff. She has an opponent who can reduce the payoffs. This paper uses adversarial risk analysis to find a solution to her route selection problem. It shows how the traveler is advantaged by having an accurate subjective distribution over the costs/payoffs and by having a Bayesian prior for her opponent's strategic choices. The results are relevant to military convoy routing, corporate competition, and certain games.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2602.11048,
title = {Adversarial Graph Traversal},
author = {David Banks and Elvan Ceyhan and Leah Johnson and Li Zhou},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2602.11048},
year = {2026}
}
Comments
10 pages, 4 figures. Simulation study included