A philosophical argument against time machines
Abstract
Time machines are predictions of Einstein's theory of general relativity and provide a myriad of unsolved paradoxes. Convincing and general arguments against time machines and their paradoxes are missing in physics and philosophy so far. In this article, a philosophical argument against time machines is given. When thought of as a process, individuation refuses the idea of time machines, in particular travels into the past. With the aid of Nietzsche-Heraclitus' philosophy of becoming and Simondon's notion of process of individuation, I propose that time machines are modern fables, created by the man of . In the formula of Nietzsche, I suggest the antipode to time machines.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1709.02060,
title = {A philosophical argument against time machines},
author = {Juliano C. S. Neves},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.02060},
year = {2019}
}
Comments
14 pages. Version with improvements, corrections, new references and section. Published in The Agonist