Related papers: A fundamental threat to quantum cryptography: grav…
Recently, a new type of attack, which exploits the efficiency mismatch of two single photon detectors (SPD) in a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, has been proposed. In this paper, we propose another "time-shift" attack that exploits…
It is known that statistical predictions of quantum theory do not depend on its interpretation. In particular, an experiment cannot distinguish between the Copenhagen interpretation (involving no hidden variables) and the de Broglie-Bohm…
A central claim in quantum cryptography is that secrecy can be proved rigorously, based on the assumption that the relevant information-processing systems obey the laws of quantum physics. This claim has recently been challenged by…
The security of the previous quantum key distribution protocols, which is guaranteed by the nature of physics law, is based on the legitimate users. However, the impersonation of Alice or Bob by eavesdropper, in practice. will be existed in…
Unconditional security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol has been proved by exploiting the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics, but the practical quantum key distribution system maybe hacked by considering the imperfect state…
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) with classical Bob has recently been suggested and proven robust. Following this work, QKD with classical Alice was also suggested and proven robust. The above protocols are ideal in the sense that they make…
Unconditionally secure bit commitment and coin flipping are known to be impossible in the classical world. Bit commitment is known to be impossible also in the quantum world. We introduce a related new primitive - {\em quantum bit escrow}.…
We introduce a quantum key distribution protocol designed to expose fake users that connect to Alice or Bob for the purpose of monopolising the link and denying service. It inherently resists attempts to exhaust Alice and Bob's initial…
In semiquantum key-distribution (Boyer et al.) Alice has the same capability as in BB84 protocol, but Bob can measure and prepare qubits only in $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$ basis and reflect any other qubit. We study an eavesdropping…
The laws of physics play a crucial role in the security of quantum key distribution (QKD). This fact has often been misunderstood as if the security of QKD would be based only on the laws of physics. As the experts know well, things are…
Quantum Cryptography or Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique that allows the secure distribution of a bit string, used as key in cryptographic protocols. When it was noted that quantum computers could break public key cryptosystems…
There had been well known claims of unconditionally secure quantum protocols for bit commitment. However, we, and independently Mayers, showed that all proposed quantum bit commitment schemes are, in principle, insecure because the sender,…
In this letter, we concentrate on the very recently proposed Measurement Device Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI QKD) protocol by Lo, Curty and Qi (PRL, 2012). We study how one can suitably present an eavesdropping strategy on MDI…
Despite enormous progress both in theoretical and experimental quantum cryptography, the security of most current implementations of quantum key distribution is still not established rigorously. One of the main problems is that the security…
This paper demonstrates the vulnerability of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchanger to compromised random number generator(s) even if these random numbers are used solely to generate the noises emulating the Johnson…
Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive in which Bob wishes to commit a secret bit to Alice. Perfectly secure bit commitment has been proven impossible through asynchronous exchange of classical and quantum information.…
Quantum bit commitment (QBC) is insecure in the standard non-relativistic quantum cryptographic framework, essentially because Alice can exploit quantum steering to defer making her commitment. Two assumptions in this framework are that:…
The first quantum cryptography protocol, proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84), has been widely studied in the last years. This protocol uses four states (more precisely, two complementary bases) for the encoding of the classical…
In the original BB84 protocol by Bennett and Brassard, an eavesdropper is detected because his attempts to intercept information result in a quantum bit error rate (QBER) of at least 25%. Here we design an alternative quantum key…
The Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol is the most widely implemented quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme. However, despite enormous theoretical and experimental efforts in the past decades, the security of this protocol with imperfect…