Related papers: Some Attacks On Quantum-based Cryptographic Protoc…
Cryptographic protocols, such as protocols for secure function evaluation (SFE), have played a crucial role in the development of modern cryptography. The extensive theory of these protocols, however, deals almost exclusively with classical…
Recent results of Kaplan et al., building on previous work by Kuwakado and Morii, have shown that a wide variety of classically-secure symmetric-key cryptosystems can be completely broken by quantum chosen-plaintext attacks (qCPA). In such…
Superdense coding has long been regarded as a secure quantum communication protocol. It is natural to assume that employing logical quantum states with error-correcting capability would not compromise this security. However, in the context…
Secure key distribution among two remote parties is impossible when both are classical, unless some unproven (and arguably unrealistic) computation-complexity assumptions are made, such as the difficulty of factorizing large numbers. On the…
In this paper we review a number of issues on the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols that bear directly on the relevant physics or mathematical representation of the QKD cryptosystem. It is shown that the cryptosystem…
We demonstrate that secure quantum key distribution systems based on continuous variables implementations can operate beyond the apparent 3 dB loss limit that is implied by the beam splitting attack . The loss limit was established for…
We investigate the performance of Gaussianmodulated coherent-state QKD protocols in the presence of canonical attacks, which are collective Gaussian attacks resulting in Gaussian channels described by one of the possible canonical forms. We…
In this paper we analyze the security of the so-called quantum tomographic cryptography with the source producing entangled photons via an experimental scheme proposed in Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 37903 (2004). We determine the range of the…
A quantum encryption scheme (also called private quantum channel, or state randomization protocol) is a one-time pad for quantum messages. If two parties share a classical random string, one of them can transmit a quantum state to the other…
Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) have been shown to be subject to various detector side-channel attacks that compromise the promised unconditional security. Most notable is a general class of attacks adopting the…
The development of large quantum computers will have dire consequences for cryptography. Most of the symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to quantum algorithms. Grover's search algorithm gives a square root time…
In recent years, several hacking attacks have broken the security of quantum cryptography implementations by exploiting the presence of losses and the ability of the eavesdropper to tune detection efficiencies. We present a simple attack of…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) establishes secure links between remote communication parties. As a key problem for various QKD protocols, security analysis gives the amount of secure keys regardless of the eavesdropper's computational…
Theoretical quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols commonly rely on the use of qubits (quantum bits). In reality, however, due to practical limitations, the legitimate users are forced to employ a larger quantum (Hilbert) space, say a…
The promise of secure cryptographic quantum key distribution schemes is based on the use of quantum effects in the spin space. We point out that in fact in many current quantum cryptography protocols the space part of the wave function is…
An attack on the ``Bennett-Brassard 84''(BB84) quantum key-exchange protocol in which Eve exploits the action of gravitation to infer information about the quantum-mechanical state of the qubit exchanged between Alice and Bob, is described.…
Quantum key distribution, first proposed by Bennett and Brassard, provides a possible key distribution scheme whose security depends only on the quantum laws of physics. So far the protocol has been proved secure even under channel noise…
Quantum computers, that may become available one day, would impact many scientific fields, most notably cryptography since many asymmetric primitives are insecure against an adversary with quantum capabilities. Cryptographers are already…
We investigate the security of generalized quantum multiple-access channels. We provide the formula for the achievable rate region of secure communication in the scenario of two senders and a single receiver. We explicitly specify a…
Protecting secure random key from eavesdropping in quantum key distribution protocols has been well developed. In this letter, we further study how to detect and eliminate eavesdropping on the random base string in such protocols. The…