Related papers: Why there is no impossibility theorem on Secure Qu…

Quantum bit commitment has long been known to be impossible. Nevertheless, just as in the classical case, imposing certain constraints on the power of the parties may enable the construction of asymptotically secure protocols. Here, we…

This article describes a quantum bit commitment protocol, QBC1, based on entanglement destruction via forced measurements and proves its unconditional security.

A simple un-entanglement based quantum bit commitment scheme is presented. Although commitment is unconditionally secure but concealment is not.

Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic task that guarantees a secure commitment between two mutually mistrustful parties and is a building block for many cryptographic primitives, including coin tossing, zero-knowledge proofs,…

In the task cryptographers call bit commitment, one party encrypts a prediction in a way that cannot be decrypted until they supply a key, but has only one valid key. Bit commitment has many applications, and has been much studied, but…

While unconditionally secure bit commitment (BC) is considered impossible within the quantum framework, it can be obtained under relativistic or experimental constraints. Here we study whether such BC can lead to secure quantum oblivious…

The no-go theorem regarding unconditionally secure Quantum Bit Commitment protocols is a relevant result in quantum cryptography. Such result has been used to prove the impossibility of unconditional security for other protocols, such as…

Quantum bit commitment has been known to be impossible by the independent proofs of Mayers, and Lo and Chau, under the assumption that the whole quantum states right before the unveiling phase are static to users. We here provide an…

The impossibility proof of unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is crucially dependent on the assertion that Bob is not allowed to generate probability distributions unknown to Alice. This assertion is actually not meaningful,…

We spell out details of a simple argument for a security bound for the secure relativistic quantum bit commitment protocol of Ref. [1].

This article describes a quantum bit commitment protocol, QBC3, based on entanglement destruction via forced measurements and proves its unconditional security. Some comments on the current status of the field are also made.

We present a new quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol based on counterfactual quantum cryptography. We analyze the security of this protocol, find that it can resist the attack presented by QBC's no-go theorem. Our protocol is simple, and…

Due to the commonly known impossibility results, unconditional security for oblivious transfer is seen as impossible even in the quantum world. In this paper, we try to overcome these impossibility results by proposing a protocol which is…

Zero-knowledge proof system is an important protocol that can be used as a basic block for construction of other more complex cryptographic protocols. Quantum zero-knowledge protocols have been proposed but, since their implementation…

In this paper, we introduce a new quantum bit commitment protocol which is practically secure against entanglement attacks. A general cheating strategy is discussed and shown to be practically ineffective against the proposed approach.

A new relativistic quantum protocol is proposed allowing to implement the bit commitment scheme. The protocol is based on the idea that in the relativistic case the field propagation to the region of space accessible to measurement…

It has been recently shown by Mayers that no bit commitment scheme is secure if the participants have unlimited computational power and technology. However it was noticed that a secure protocol could be obtained by forcing the cheater to…

This paper addresses the controversy between Mayers, Lo and Chau on one side, and Yuen on the opposite side, on whether there exist or not unconditionally secure protocols. For such purpose, a complete classification of all possible bit…

We give a simple proof that it is impossible to guarantee the classicality of inputs into any mistrustful quantum cryptographic protocol. The argument illuminates the impossibility of unconditionally secure quantum implementations of…

This paper has been withdrawn by the authors,because the proposed protocol is still coverd by the no-go theorem of Mayers, Lo and Chau. We thank H-K. Lo and HF Chau for helpful correspondences.