Related papers: Attacks on Symmetric Quantum Coin-Tossing Protocol…
We show that the criticism of a recent comment \cite{ch2} on the insecurity of a quantum secret sharing protocol proposed in \cite{v2} is based on a misconception about the meaning of security and hence is invalid. The same misconception…
We analyze the security of a quantum secure direct communication protocol equipped with authentication. We first propose a specifc attack on the protocol by which, an adversary can break the secret already shared between Alice and Bob, when…
We consider a cryptographically motivated framework for quantum metrology in the presence of a malicious adversary. We begin by devising an estimation strategy for a (potentially) altered resource (due to a malicious adversary) and quantify…
We present a new quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol based on counterfactual quantum cryptography. We analyze the security of this protocol, find that it can resist the attack presented by QBC's no-go theorem. Our protocol is simple, and…
An algorithm is presented which implements a probabilistic attack on the key-exchange protocol based on permutation parity machines. Instead of imitating the synchronization of the communicating partners, the strategy consists of a Monte…
We devised a protocol that allows two parties, who may malfunction or intentionally convey incorrect information in communication through a quantum channel, to verify each other's measurements and agree on each other's results. This has…
All instances of the semidirect key exchange protocol, a generalisation of the famous Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, satisfy the so-called "telescoping equality"; in some cases, this equality has been used to construct an attack. In…
Mayers, Lo and Chau proved unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible. It is shown that their proof is valid only for a particular model of quantum bit commitment encoding, in general it does not hold good. A different…
It has been established that quantum algorithms can solve several key cryptographic problems more efficiently than classical computers. As progress continues in the field of quantum computing it is important to understand the risks they…
Semi-quantum key distribution protocols are designed to allow two users to establish a secure secret key when one of the two users is limited to performing certain "classical" operations. There have been several such protocols developed…
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol has been demonstrated as a viable solution to detector side-channel attacks. One of the main advantages of MDI-QKD is that the security can be proved without making…
We propose a new kind of individual attack, based on randomly selected dissipation, on Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system with lossy and noisy quantum channel. Since an adversary with super…
The participant attack is the most serious threat for quantum secret-sharing protocols. We present a method to analyze the security of quantum secret-sharing protocols against this kind of attack taking the scheme of Hillery, Buzek, and…
We provide a security analysis for continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols based on the transmission of squeezed vacuum states measured via homodyne detection. We employ a version of the entropic uncertainty relation for…
A two-layer quantum protocol for secure transmission of data using qubits is presented. The protocol is an improvement over the BB84 QKD protocol. BB84, in conjunction with the one-time pad algorithm, has been shown to be unconditionally…
We investigate limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocols that use pulsed coherent light. In particular, we analyze two sequential attacks based on unambiguous…
In this comment, we show that the special attack [S.-J. Qin, F. Gao, Q.-Y. Wen, F.-C. Zhu, Opt. Commun. 281 (2008) 5472.], which claims to be able to obtain all the transmitted secret message bit values of the protocol of the multiparty…
We show that all proposed quantum bit commitment schemes are insecure because the sender, Alice, can almost always cheat successfully by using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type of attack and delaying her measurement until she opens her…
In a recent paper, Lo and Chau explain how to break a family of quantum bit commitment schemes, and they claim that their attack applies to the 1993 protocol of Brassard, Cr\'epeau, Jozsa and Langlois (BCJL). The intuition behind their…
I prove the security of quantum key distribution against individual attacks for realistic signals sources, including weak coherent pulses and downconversion sources. The proof applies to the BB84 protocol with the standard detection scheme…