Related papers: Quantum message authentication codes

Public-key cryptosystems for quantum messages are considered from two aspects: public-key encryption and public-key authentication. Firstly, we propose a general construction of quantum public-key encryption scheme, and then construct an…

The class MA consists of languages that can be efficiently verified by classical probabilistic verifiers using a single classical certificate, and the class QMA consists of languages that can be efficiently verified by quantum verifiers…

Consider the problem: Alice wishes to send the same key to $n-1$ users (Bob, Carol,. . . , Nathan), while preventing eavesdropper Eve from acquiring information without being detected. The problem has no solution in the classical…

This paper has been withdrawn. The main technical result will reappear in the new version of quant-ph/0501003.

Post-quantum cryptography studies the security of classical, i.e. non-quantum cryptographic protocols against quantum attacks. Until recently, the considered adversaries were assumed to use quantum computers and behave like classical…

We analyze the security of a quantum secure direct communication protocol equipped with authentication. We first propose a specifc attack on the protocol by which, an adversary can break the secret already shared between Alice and Bob, when…

Signing quantum messages has long been considered impossible even under computational assumptions. In this work, we challenge this notion and provide three innovative approaches to sign quantum messages that are the first to ensure…

Authentication provides the trust people need to engage in transactions. The advent of physical keys that are impossible to copy promises to revolutionize this field. Up to now, such keys have been verified by classical challenge-response…

Consider a protocol in which Belinda seals a (classical) message. She gives the resulting sealed message to Charlie, who can either unseal and read the message or return it unopened to Belinda. If he returns it unopened, Belinda should be…

Unconditionally secure message authentication is an important part of quantum cryptography (QC). In this correspondence, we analyze security effects of using a key obtained from QC for authentication purposes in later rounds of QC. In…

Recently Boyer and Mor pointed out the first conclusion of Lemma 1 in our original paper is not correct, and therefore, the proof of Theorem 5 based on Lemma 1 is wrong. Furthermore, they gave a direct proof for Theorem 5 and affirmed the…

We give a new class of security definitions for authentication in the quantum setting. These definitions capture and strengthen existing definitions of security against quantum adversaries for both classical message authentication codes…

Although a quantum state requires exponentially many classical bits to describe, the laws of quantum mechanics impose severe restrictions on how that state can be accessed. This paper shows in three settings that quantum messages have only…

It is shown that the effect of transmission loss has often not been properly taken into account in the security proofs on quantum key distribution. A class of general attacks to be called probabilistic re-sends attack is described that has…

This paper has been withdrawn by the author due to the incorrect argument for the security.

This paper has been withdrawn by the author(s), due a crucial error on the entanglement of $\Gamma$ registers.

In this paper, we generalize a secured direct communication process between N users with partial and full cooperation of quantum server. The security analysis of authentication and communication processes against many types of attacks…

This paper has been withdrawn by the author(s), due to some technical problem.

Large-scale quantum computing is a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography. In strong "quantum access" security models, numerous symmetric-key cryptosystems are also vulnerable. We consider classical encryption in a model…

We show that the Mayers-Shor-Preskill approach and Renner's approach to proving the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) are essentially the same. We begin our analysis by considering a special case of QKD called privacy amplification…